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Abstract
This paper reviews the existing law and economics literature on crime, noting
where various models might apply to the terror context. Specifically, it focuses
on two strands of the literature, deterrence and incapacitation. Challenging the
conventional application of the basic rational agent model of crime in the con-
text of terrorism, it considers anti-terror measures enacted by different countries,
highlighting how the details of the laws correspond to the insights from economic
models of crime. In conclusion, the paper proposes an efficient sorting mechanism
in which individuals will be provided with adequate incentives to reveal their type
to law enforcement authorities.
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Abstract. This paper reviews the existing law and economics literature on crime, noting where 
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literature, deterrence and incapacitation. Challenging the conventional application of the basic 
rational agent model of crime in the context of terrorism, it considers anti-terror measures enacted 
by different countries, highlighting how the details of the laws correspond to the insights from 
economic models of crime. In conclusion, the paper proposes an efficient sorting mechanism in 
which individuals will be provided with adequate incentives to reveal their type to law enforcement 
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1. Introduction 
Until recently, economic analysis of terrorist behavior was relatively underdeveloped.  However, 
given the recent focus of policymakers on measures to fight terrorism, it may be useful to examine 
what insights the field of economics has to offer to inform the development of counter-terrorism 
policy.  One of the most fruitful areas within economics to mine for insights in this regard is the 
law and economics of criminal behavior.  In many (but certainly not all) ways, terrorist activities 
resemble criminal activities, and so it might be useful to apply (and modify where necessary) the 
economic models of crime in this area. 
-1- 
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 This article attempts to lay out the implications of the law and economics literature on crime 
as they relate to terrorism.1  The economic model of crime and law enforcement relies on the 
balance between the benefits from offending and the respective costs in terms of probability and 
severity of punishment, with respect to individuals (decision whether or not to commit a crime) and 
society (design of optimal law enforcement) to achieve efficient deterrence.2 The preferences of 
terrorists are very important to the understanding of the benefits from offending (even if these 
preferences are not well understood generally by others) as well as for establishing effective 
punishment.3 Penalty enhancements only make sense in the economic model if perceived as more 
severe by potential and actual offenders, and not just by society (including victims) generally. 
Although many commentators suspect that ordinary punishment is inappropriate because terrorists 
have peculiar preferences, the fact of the matter is that there has been no empirical assessment of 
preferences for terrorism and governments suspect that terrorists care about the severity of ordinary 
punishment to same extent.4  
 Another strand of the economic literature looks at criminal incapacitation rather than 
deterrence. Efficient incapacitation is achieved by eliminating opportunities for terrorism at 
minimum cost for society. One possibility is simply to eliminate the physical ability to commit 
offenses by imprisonment or by imposing the death penalty. Another possibility is to reduce assets 
made available to terrorism by cutting terrorists off from their funds. A third alternative is to 
increase the distance between terrorists and potential victims by imposing harsher immigration 
laws, including deportation.  
 Having in mind the nature of terrorism, we should look at efficient legal policies at the 
individual and organization levels. Financial penalties are unlikely to play any substantive role with 
respect to individual terrorists (most of them are indigent any way), but may play a larger role 
regarding fund-supporting organizations. The effectiveness of deportation is enhanced when 
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applied to well-known leaders (e.g., radical clerics) rather than minor and obscure members of the 
organization.  
We begin our analysis discussing what insights are available from models that focus on 
corporate or collective crimes as they relate to terrorism.  We then discuss the basic rational agent 
model of crime in the context of terrorism, pointing out the assumptions that might need to be 
changed in this new area of application. We then present a sampling of anti-terror measures enacted 
by different countries, highlighting how the details of the laws correspond to the insights from 
economic models of crime.  We then conclude with an innovative mechanism design approach to 
mitigating the tensions between security and privacy in implementing policies geared toward 
monitoring and prosecuting terror suspects. 
 Our paper does not address legal international cooperation for anti-terrorism measures 
(Sandler 2005). The current economic literature on cooperation at the level of criminal prosecution 
and criminal law is extremely under-developed and seems to support the comparative federalism 
paradigm (in the context of this article, jurisdictions should compete by means of tougher 
legislation to avoid terrorism attacks) which is not very appealing in the context of terrorism (given 
external costs) (Garoupa 1997; Teichman, 2005). 
 
2.  Communal Liability: Identifying the Relevant Unit 
While an individual may independently carry out an act of terrorism, the nature, the goal and the 
magnitude of terror crimes make terrorism more like corporate crime and organized crime than 
individual crime. Honor, pride and family status limit the persuasive power that individual 
punishment will have on a potential terrorist, while the continuity and long-term goals of the 
terrorism organization enhance the effects that group liability may yield. While preventing terrorist 
acts requires deterring those individuals who would otherwise commit the acts, the role of terrorist 
organizations and networks suggests that anti-terrorism policy must focus incentives and 
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punishment on the terrorist group as well as the individual terrorist. Notice we focus on two distinct 
aspects. We consider the most obvious case of liability for active supporters of terrorism, but also 
the less obvious case of liability for those who benefit indirectly from terrorism or are passive 
supporters of terrorism, that is, those who are in better position to deter terrorism and fail to do so. 
There are two different rationales for group liability. The first is based on the idea that 
terrorism has a “constituency” that benefits from terrorist acts. The group liability would target the 
constituency who benefited from the terrorist act. This is similar to the foundation of vicarious 
liability of the principal for the acts of the agent (i.e., enterprise liability). This is a rationale that 
focuses on the wrongdoers’ external benefits. The second rationale instead focuses on the 
identification of superior enforcers. Liability is imposed on the wrongdoer’s group not because the 
group benefits from the terrorist acts, but because the group can monitor and prevent terrorist acts 
more effectively. Large financial liability of groups and families that provided support, or could 
have prevented the commission of a terrorist act serves this purpose. In certain settings, this form of 
“communal liability” might prove more effective than individual criminal liability of those who 
were directly involved in the terrorist activity. This claim, based on Becker's analysis, supposes that 
spreading liability to the members of the group or family infrastructure will provide some level of 
internal monitoring, and eventually ex post sanctions on members of the group that occasioned the 
imposition of financial liability on the group as a whole.  
Within this framework of group-wide liability, family or group members of a terrorist 
become quasi-enforcers. Since groups and families are held (strictly5) liable for their members’ 
actions, the government delegates to the family or group infrastructure the task of monitoring and 
controlling potential offenders. It lowers the cost of enforcement to the government, but it increases 
the monitoring costs to such local groups. In doing so, the government must make sure the group 
has the appropriate incentives to monitor and eventually penalize its members for engaging in 
criminal activities that lead to liability for the group.  
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It should be remembered that the imposition of group liability for crimes that are not easily 
preventable or detectable from outside the group is not a novel idea. Historically, groups and clans 
were liable for the wrongs committed by group members and this ensured effective internal 
monitoring of the troublemakers within the group. Parisi and Dari Mattiacci (2004) show that the 
law applicable to inter-group wrongdoing was often characterized by rules of absolute and 
collective responsibility.6 Historically, communal liability thrives in social contexts where local 
groups and families have better information than potential victims and central enforcement 
authorities, thus providing less expensive preventive measures.7 Local groups could be superior 
enforcers because their enforcement measures are more credible and effective.8 Obviously, in the 
case of terrorist activities, local monitoring should be augmented with central enforcement. 
Through communal liability, local groups and families should be given incentives to cooperate with 
central enforcement authorities in the prevention of terrorist activities.  
The creation of internal monitoring incentives created by communal liability should be 
evaluated against the common pool effects that such system creates. The history of communal 
liability rules in ancient law can be used to illustrate this tension. Historically, the boundaries of the 
“group” for communal responsibility purposes tend to narrow overtime. The system of communal 
responsibility was never extended beyond the closer family (i.e., a group that recognized a common 
ancestor within the last three, or at most four, generations).9  
The implementation of legal policies designed to create widespread monitoring incentives 
should obviously be attentive to the respect of other important legal safeguards. There are in fact 
different ways in which families, groups, or even states can “foster” terrorist activities. Arend and 
Beck’s (1995) distinction between toleration, support and sponsorship becomes relevant in the 
context of legal policies of communal liability.10 Liability on the group can be imposed on a strict 
basis, regardless of the group’s involvement in the terrorist activities. But if strict group liability is 
found inappropriate, a specification of the standard becomes necessary. At the most conservative 
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end of the spectrum, liability of the group may be imposed only in the case of active involvement 
of the group, through sponsorship. This form of liability would not substantially depart from 
existing criminal rules. At the other end, group liability may be imposed even if the evidence 
revealed only passive acquiescence or toleration. This standard may be coupled with an inversion 
of the burden of proof. For example rules could be designed to exclude the imposition of liability 
for groups and families that cooperated with central enforcement authorities, reporting suspect 
group members, even if criminal activities were not successfully prevented. Finally, intermediate 
solutions could also be possible, imposing liability for groups that provided any form of support to 
individuals that were involved in terrorist acts.11
 
3.  Terrorism As Crime: New Dimensions 
The standard crime model provides valuable insights when considering terrorist groups as cohesive 
units. However, terrorism represents a peculiar form of crime which poses several difficulties to the 
application of the neoclassical models of crime. Crimes of terrorism are not committed by 
individuals acting in isolation, without regard to other possible actors. In the context of terrorist 
organizations, the crime results from the concerted or interdependent action of various actors 
committing – or possibly preventing – offences. Agency problems, including coordination or team 
issues, are thus likely to be pervasive in the case of organized terrorist activities. Further, families 
of terrorist members may directly or indirectly support terrorist activities, concealing the 
whereabouts of the members or providing practical or financial assistance. 
When agency problems are considered, the standard crime model needs to be extended to 
maintain its descriptive power. The adoption of a principal-agent framework can provide useful 
insights into terrorism, helping predict criminal behavior by terrorist organizations.12
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3.1  Spreading the Incentives: Insights From the Economics of Corporate Criminal Liability 
The economics of corporate criminal liability provides important insights into the punishment of 
terrorist groups since some of the problems that have identified in the literature are easily recast in 
terms of terrorists.  Ideally, with complete contracting and without liquidity constraints, individual 
liability alone would induce efficient behavior. Consequently, corporate and organizational liability 
would not be necessary and the classical economic model of crime would be enough to prescribe 
efficient policies.  
Models of corporate liability apply when contracts are incomplete or when solvency 
matters. In the context of terrorism, models of corporate liability may be predictive.  Individual 
terrorist actors may not be entirely responsive to incentives, such as suicidal bombers who are not 
afraid of jail sentences or have not enough assets to make financial penalties effective.  On the 
other hand, supporting organizations usually have extensive funds and most individual members 
(who are not suicidal bombers) care about imprisonment.   
For the case of corporate or organizational criminal liability, the existence of different 
interests within the organization can be exploited for the purpose of deterrence with the choice of 
appropriate remedies. With respect to corporations, appropriate incentives are created to deter 
business offenses, that is, offenses committed by agents with or without the shareholders' consent. 
In this context, the literature has examined whether it is desirable or not to hold an employee liable 
for corporate crimes committed by managers (Segerson and Tietenberg  1992; Polinsky and Shavell 
1993; Shavell 1997), and what the structure of optimal corporate sanctions should look like (Arlen 
1994). 
Applying by analogy the results of corporate criminal liability, it could be claimed that a 
socially optimal criminal sanctioning policy would favor large financial liability of groups and 
families that provided support, or could have prevented the commission of a terrorist act, over 
criminal liability (and jail sentences) for those individuals directly involved in the terrorist activity.  
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3.2  Agency Costs and Group Liability 
Agency costs play a central role in assessing efficient policies. In a world where the 
alignment of interests is costless, it is not relevant who is actually punished since terrorists and 
supporters (including relatives) can bargain ex ante and reallocate sanctions. Individual liability of 
terrorists alone induces efficient behavior. However, in the particular case of terrorist activities, 
agency costs exist and can be significant. Usually there is asymmetric information because active 
members of a terrorist group have more and better information concerning terrorist activities than 
other members of their family or support group.  
One consequence of the asymmetry between these actors is that communal liability will 
distort incentives inside the group. On one hand, it will deter those harmful activities that are easily 
observable but will induce active terrorists to engage relatively more on those harmful activities 
that are hardly observable and controllable by their families and group members. On the other 
hand, spreading of liability might affect productive activities that are somehow correlated but not 
easily separable from terrorist activities (e.g., money laundering) (Garoupa 2000). 
In an ideal world in which the individual terrorist bears the full burden of the sanction, 
group and individual sanctions are substitutes. In the case of terrorist activities it is very unlikely 
that any substantial portion of the sanction can be passed along to the actual wrongdoer. This is 
because the group is often unable to shift the penalty to the actual wrongdoers, who often sacrifice 
their lives to carry out a terrorist act. When the penalty cannot effectively be placed directly on the 
wrongdoer, the group must monitor the member's actions to prevent any potential wrongdoing.  
These arguments suggest that, in spite of the general skepticism of law and economics 
scholars on the issue of corporate criminal liability (Block 1991), there may be valid considerations 
in support of group liability for the wrongdoing of one of its members. Aligning the interests of the 
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group with those of the government by making use of spreading of liability can be potentially 
effective.  
 
4.  Terrorism As Organized Crime  
The organization of terrorist activities bears some resemblance to that of organized crime.  
Organized crime can be characterized as exhibiting economies of scale, undertaking violence 
against other legal and illegal business, creating a hierarchy which internalizes negative 
externalities and manages a portfolio of risky activities, and avoiding resource dissipation through 
competitive lobbying and corruption (Fiorentini and Peltzman 1995). 
We emphasize the following differences between organized crime (including terrorism) and 
corporate crime: (i) organized crime is carried out by illegal organizations (usually without legal 
entity, but not always), the criminal market being their primary market and legitimate markets 
being secondary markets; (ii) corporate crime is carried out by legal firms (with legal entity), the 
legitimate output market being their primary market and the criminal market being their secondary 
market. Whereas organized crime exists to capitalize on criminal rents and illegal activities, 
corporations do not exist with the purpose of violating the law. Organized crime and terrorists get 
into legitimate markets in order to improve its standing on the criminal market, corporations violate 
the law so to improve their standing on legitimate markets.      
There are different reasons for the existence and persistence of organized crime and terrorist 
organizations in different societies. In general, we can say that organized crime emerges because 
there is an absence of state enforcement of property and contractual rights, which can also include 
the collapse of legitimate business institutions. Organized crime provides primitive state functions 
but at a cost typically much higher than modern governance. Thus, its control is necessary, since it 
can easily corrupt existing institutions and business environment (Skaperdas 2001). This 
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characterization can easily be applied to terrorism, the Taliban government of Afghanistan as the 
obvious example. 
The economic literature on organized crime is quite limited when compared to the work on 
individual crime and criminal law.  Economic analysis of organized crime has stressed welfare 
comparisons between different market structures (monopoly versus competitive supply) of 
offenses. Crimes are economic bads, not goods. A monopolistic market is more efficient than a 
perfectly competitive one in the presence of bads because the output is smaller (Buchanan 1973; 
Reinganum 1993; Garoupa 2000). Besides monopoly power, transaction costs also determine the 
activities of organized criminal firms, being more successful when there is a production cost 
advantage. That explains, for example, why organized crime supplies protection to illegal firms 
dealing with victimless activities where the activities are easily observable, while self-protection is 
the rule for organizations involved in appropriation (Dick 1995). Certainly terrorism fits well with 
the former rather than the latter. 
The criminal organization can be modeled as a vertical structure where the principal extracts 
some rents from the agents through extortion (Konrad and Skaperdas 1997). As long as extortion is 
a costless transfer from individuals to the criminal organization, it has been shown that not only the 
existence of extortion is social welfare improving because it makes engaging in a criminal offense 
less attractive, but it also allows the government to reduce expenditure on law enforcement (the 
government free-rides on the entry barriers created by criminal organizations). However, when 
extortion is costly because the criminal organization resorts to threats and violence, the existence of 
extortion is social welfare diminishing and may lead to more expenditure on law enforcement. 
Extortion in the context of terrorism is costly (e.g., the revolution-supporter taxes extorted by ETA 
in Spain or the Colombian terrorist groups) because they are enforced by kidnapping and murder. 
Illegal organizations however are not just the kind of firms that operate in the criminal 
market or commit business crimes. They also operate in legitimate input and output markets and 
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compete with the state in the provision of public services (two good examples are the extensive 
parts of Colombia controlled by left and right terrorist groups or the former Taliban government of 
Afghanistan). They exist as an alternative provider of goods and services to the private sector and 
compete with the government in terms of tax rates and provision of public goods. Their existence 
can have a beneficial effect because the “kleptocratic” tendencies of the government are moderated 
(Grossman 1995). However, they may distort legal markets (e.g. money laundering, control of 
unions, unfair competition) and create inefficiencies (Gambetta and Reuter 1995). Incorporation 
into legitimate business can be a problem, but at the same time a solution by making detection 
easier (because activities in the legitimate markets are easier to monitor and be detected). 
The institutional environment of organized crime (and terrorism) has not been analyzed by 
economists with the attention it deserves. One major issue that constrains the relationship between 
those involved in organized crime, in particular terrorism, is that contracts are not enforceable in 
court. That is not to say that illegal contracts are not enforceable. One mechanism to enforce an 
illegal contract is the threat and use of violence. The participants in illegal markets lack access to 
state-provided facilities for settlement of disputes. Consequently, violence can be an effective 
method to resolve disagreements. Furthermore, victims of violence are disadvantaged in seeking 
police protection: the process of providing an informative complaint will convey information to the 
police about the illegal activities of the complainant. 
Violence further arises when the criminal organization wants to monopolize the market or 
avoid competitive entry. Moreover, in the long run, the violent gang and terrorist group can usually 
replace internal violence by reputation increasing profits and saving on labor costs (Reuter 1983). 
The threat of violence also affects the organization of the market ex ante by avoiding 
misunderstandings and controlling the degree of subjective uncertainty as well as investment in 
reputation (Konrad 2004). 
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A second mechanism to enforce an illegal contract is reverting to arbitration. Seeking the 
Mafia's arbitration can be of advantage to criminal firms because violence is costly and uncertain: 
the cost of acquiring reputation is high in an environment where disputes are frequent. Moreover, 
there is a complete absence of feasible symbols of quality and reliability. On the supply side, 
allowing the Mafia to act as a referee solves the problem of defining property rights. In the context 
of terrorism, a similar argument applies to the unitary leadership of the terrorist organization (e.g. 
internal rifts within the IRA or ETA were dealt swiftly and without mercy by the leadership every 
time they aroused). 
Given that enforcing criminal contracts is expensive, either because violence is not 
inexpensive (even if only at a threat level) or because solving the matter within the Mafia's 
institutional system is not costless (it may include costs of arbitration, rents to be paid as 
subscription, bribes), one would think criminal organization should prefer an employment 
relationship rather than subcontracting. Monitoring and enforcing a contract is relatively easier in 
an employment relationship. The cost of monitoring subcontractors is augmented because there is 
no book-auditing and record-keeping must be minimal to reduce evidence. 
The problem posed by an employee is that his detection can compromise the whole 
organization with higher probability than an external subcontractor. Employees can provide 
information about past and future deals leading to arrest and seizure of assets involved in the 
transaction. Therefore the entrepreneur aims to structure the relationship so as to reduce the amount 
of information available to them concerning his own participation, and to ensure that they have 
minimal incentive to inform against him. Moreover, employees are afraid of other employees. Thus 
dispersion and monitoring naturally emerges as to control individual risk. 
One consequence of these observations is that illegal firms should be smaller than if the 
product were legal. In policy terms, sanctioning the organization more severely affects not only the 
dimension but also the characteristics of a criminal network. Severe punishment reduces the 
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dimension of the network, but it might increase the effectiveness (criminal productivity) of its 
members. Eventually smaller firms are easier to manage and consequently fewer mistakes are 
committed, diminishing the likelihood of detection. 
 This last point is especially salient with respect to terrorist groups to the extent that they too 
face organizational problems that are more easily managed in smaller groups.  Also, given the 
public nature of the good they produce, a smaller group may be more effective since there will be 
less free-riding (Olson 1971).  To effectively monitor and provide adequate incentives to workers, 
terror groups tend to tap into existing social networks such that they can select for high demanders 
of the public good.  They also use the social network to provide incentives in cases where standard 
labor incentives are not possible (e.g., when success requires that the worker dies).  So, for 
example, if organized crime and terror organizations each draw their employees from cohesive 
communities, the value of status (even past death) is greater, and there can be strong expectations 
that rewards and punishments will be visited upon surviving individuals about whom the worker 
cares a great deal.  Also, especially in the context of terror activities, it makes sense that workers 
are often selected on the basis of their religiosity since expectations regarding the afterlife can 
provide strong incentives and can allow for very effective monitoring (Klick forthcoming). 
Terror groups also seem to build counterparts in legitimate markets, just as we see with 
organized crime.  As with organized crime, these legitimate businesses or political groups serve to 
help fund the terror activities (e.g., Sinn Fein and the IRA, some of the Islamic charity groups that 
have come under suspicion in recent years, religious schools in Afghanistan, Batasuna and ETA, 
etc.).  This vertical integration arises given the high transactions costs terror groups would have in 
dealing with completely legitimate businesses (Iannaccone 2004).  
Given the relatively undeveloped state of economic analysis of organized crime, the 
literature does not offer huge insights into the nature of terrorist organizations.  However, it would 
seem that the similarities of the two institutions, in particular the observation that terror groups 
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generate public goods, could generate a number of interesting empirical predictions and policy 
recommendations. 
Law enforcement can also benefit from the insights of the principal-agent setup. Terrorism 
is usually a cooperative (even if not organized in the sense of a vertical hierarchy) crime in the 
sense that it involves more than one individual. In this context, distrust between agents and 
principals may deter crime ex ante and reveal information and evidence ex post. Legal mechanisms 
that create distrust between different parties (e.g., plea-bargaining or leniency programs) generate a 
chilling effect so that the different parties are less likely to violate the law (since each party is afraid 
that the other will make a deal with the authorities and provide incriminatory evidence). In the case 
that a violation does happen, the same legal mechanism is useful to get information and evidence 
from the different parties. Naturally well-designed plea-bargaining or leniency programs increase 
the effectiveness of law enforcement and reduce enforcement costs. However, if not well designed, 
plea-bargaining could be counterproductive because it diminishes the expected cost of illegal 
activities and thus it generates more terrorism (Garoupa 2005).  
The reputation of the terrorist group is very important to undermine law enforcement 
efforts. The conventional model assumes a never-to-capitulate enforcement policy which hinges on 
the government’s ability to fully control deterrence with full credibility. By allowing reputation 
costs and limits, including budget constraints and electoral cycles, to the government’s choice of 
legal policy, we can see how precommitment not to negotiate can become a liability in law 
enforcement. Nevertheless, making concessions under plea-bargaining can also limit the credibility 
of the government’s policy (Lapan and Sandler 1988; Lapan and Sandler 1993; Sandler and Enders 
2004). 
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5. Terrorism as Crime: Revisiting the Basic Crime Model 
Traditionally economic analysis of crime has been concerned with individual deterrence from a 
cost-benefit analysis viewpoint. In the usual Becker-Polinsky-Shavell setup, potential criminals 
compare the illegal gain from committing an offence with the expected cost, including expected 
punishment. The theory of optimal law enforcement has emerged as a normative comprehensive 
framework to prescribe optimal legal policies when individuals behave rationally.13
In the standard models of crime, offences are committed by rational individuals who decide 
whether or not to commit the crime based on the probability and severity of punishment. Some of 
the insights provided in the context of the rational individual can be usefully carried over into the 
terrorism context.  For example, it has been noted in the literature that expected punishment should 
increase with the harmfulness of the criminal act (Polinsky and Shavell 1992). One can argue that 
terrorism is usually associated with more socially costly offenses and much more serious 
consequences, and so enforcement should be harsher.  
Further, it has been shown that when the government observes how difficult individuals are 
to be apprehended only after expending enforcement resources, the optimal sanction should be 
maximal for those most difficult to apprehend (Bebchuk and Kaplow 1993). If apprehension rates 
for terrorists are lower (low probabilities of detecting, apprehending and punishing criminals), this 
model of optimal sanction would provide an additional justification for harsher punishment. 
One could also argue that punishment should be more severe in the context of terrorism if it 
is found that terrorists (including supporting organizations) are on average wealthier or hold more 
assets than other categories of criminals.14
To the extent to which financial penalties are imposed on terror group assets, the relevance 
of risk profiles come into play. Economic theory usually treats organizations as risk neutral and 
individuals as risk averse. According to the prevailing theory of optimal penalties, risk neutral 
terrorist groups should be more severely punished than risk-averse individuals. Higher penalties 
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would in turn allow lower enforcement probabilities, a predicate that is consistent with the 
empirically observable lower apprehension rate (Polinksy and Shavell 1979). 
The economic models of marginal deterrence could become a serious concern for terrorism. 
Marginal deterrence becomes relevant when criminals choose their criminal conduct from a range 
of harmful acts to commit (for example, whether to commit rape or also to kill the victim). In such 
contexts, the threat of sanctions plays a dual role. Sanctions should aim at deterring the lesser 
crime, but for individuals who choose to commit the lesser crime, there should be a sufficient 
escalation in the threat to deter the commission of the more serious crime. Marginal deterrence 
pursues deterrence of a more harmful act by threatening a higher sanction than that imposed for a 
less harmful act. In the case of terrorist acts, the issue of marginal deterrence could be of critical 
importance. For example, penalties for the bombing of a building should be high enough to deter 
the act, but maximal penalties should only be imposed for the most harmful terrorist activities 
(Stigler 1970; Wilde 1992).  
A similar logic applies to the case of attempt of terrorism.15 The sanction for attempts 
should never be larger than the sanction for causing harm. Further, attempts should be severely 
punished when the government cannot determine the probability of harm but does know the 
magnitude of the potential harm (Shavell 1990). This result is important for the context of terrorism 
where the likelihood of success is relatively low. 
At the individual level, the standard crime models may need to be modified slightly to 
generate useful predictions and policy prescriptions in the terrorist context.  For example, some 
terrorists may gain utility from the prospect of receiving certain punishments (e.g., the death 
penalty) if they wish to be viewed as martyrs for their cause.  Incorporating this concern into the 
crime model is not straight forward.  Presumably, the desire to be a martyr is subordinate to the 
desire to be effective in carrying out the terror activity.16  If it were not, terrorists would not spend 
resources in planning and carrying out their attacks since they could achieve martyrdom relatively 
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easily without any preparation.  For example, it would be quite simple to become a martyr by 
charging toward a well protected enemy target with a weapon.  Since execution or imprisonment 
will preclude the terrorist from engaging in future terror activities, it would appear that increasing 
punishments or the probability of apprehension will have a deterrent effect, even if the terrorist gets 
some value out of martyrdom.  However, on the margin, this factor might imply that some forms of 
punishment will be more effective than others.  For example, shaming mechanisms that are likely 
to lower the terrorist’s status among his network could be relatively effective. 
Another issue, which is addressed more fully below, involves the public good nature of the 
terrorist’s activities.  That is, the benefits of the crime (i.e., the costs inflicted on individuals 
constituting the enemy of the terrorist group), in this context, accrue to many individuals beyond 
those directly involved.  Thus, policy prescriptions can profitably exploit the problems that arise 
from the provision of public goods. 
 
6. Implications For the Security of Victims 
In the previous sections we have discussed terrorism if committed by individuals in a setup without 
agency costs (classical theory) and in a setup with agency costs (importing insights from corporate 
criminal liability).  In these discussions, the behavior of victims was implicitly exogenous.  
However, a more general model needs to incorporate incentives faced by victims as well.  
Potential victims can exercise security measures in order to reduce the probability of 
victimization. Nevertheless, it is not clear if these security measures are part of efficient deterrence, 
let alone if the government should encourage them. Security measures are chosen by potential 
victims for private reasons; hence the choice of precaution is generally not socially optimal 
(Shavell 1991). 
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Within the economic literature on private precaution, we can distinguish three arguments 
against the efficiency of security or victimization avoidance measures. Even though developed in 
the context of the classical model, these arguments can easily be extended to terrorism. 
The first argument against the efficiency of private precaution goes along the following 
lines: victims are expected to over-invest in precaution because they do not take into account the 
gains for the perpetrator. The argument that a victim, whether an individual or a group, ignores 
criminal gains implies that the private value of precaution is higher than its social value (Ben-
Shahar and Harel 1995). 
A second argument predicts over-investment by a different rationale. Faced with a victim 
that takes security measures, the perpetrator will prey on the individual that took fewer precautions. 
As a consequence, security measures divert rather than deter crime. However, because victims do 
not care about overall deterrence, but their own likelihood of victimization, they over-invest in 
precaution (Hui-Wen and Png 1994). 
The last argument goes in the opposite direction: victims will tend to under-invest in 
precaution because they anticipate that the government will reduce public enforcement accordingly. 
Alternatively, they over-rely on governmental law enforcement. The private value of precaution is 
lower than its social value (Hylton 1996). 
The problem of inefficient behavior by potential victims has led Harel to argue for a 
“contributory fault” rule in criminal law (Harel 1994). In tort law, contributory negligence and 
comparative negligence rules are rules by which responsibility for an accident is apportioned 
between the tortfeasor and victim. Damages are rendered non recoverable or are reduced when the 
victim was also negligent. A similar interpretation is proposed for criminal law: if a victim satisfies 
the standard precaution, the offender is inflicted with a high sanction; if a victim fails the standard 
precaution, the offender is inflicted with a low sanction. Offenders have some information on 
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potential victims' private precaution and will search for victims who fail to take the standard 
precaution. This obviously induces victims to choose the standard precaution. 
Cohen presents a similar idea though less radical with respect to sentencing of economic 
crimes and new technology offenses (Cohen 2000). Economic crimes against victims with higher 
costs of prevention should be more severely punished. In fact, if it is usually more difficult for the 
government to prevent business crimes than the private sector (essentially due to asymmetries of 
information), offenders should be more severely punished when the victim is the government rather 
than the private sector. 
 Certainly the choice of targets by terrorists seems to be related to the degree of self-
protection by victims, with the obvious examples of the attacks in New York (September 11, 2001), 
Madrid (March 11, 2004), and London (July 7 and 21, 2005), and more commonly in the case of 
Palestinian suicide bombers in Israel. The economic approach suggests that bombing trains or buses 
and killing innocent civilians could be more effective from the viewpoint of terrorists due to the 
high security protection offered to public officials and buildings.  
In order to achieve more security, potential victims may have to help authorities to detect 
and punish crime. Usually, a victim decides to report suspicious behavior and help enforcers by 
considering several aspects: the cost of reporting, including reputation and possible effects on 
utility; the consequent increase in the likelihood of recovery if a crime has already been committed, 
in particular compensation; the effect on deterrence and incapacitation of future crimes (future 
security); and legal obligations that must be fulfilled (depending on which criminal liability rules 
are in place).  
Strict monetary compensation for reporting would cover some of the costs borne by the 
actual or potential victim. However it might create moral hazard by reducing the appropriate 
incentive to self-care for security ex ante (in a way, this monetary compensation would play the 
role of insurance) (Garoupa 2001).
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7.  Political Economy of Anti-Terrorism Legal Policy 
Special attention should be devoted to the political economy aspects of terrorism. So far we have 
analyzed how legal policy, including criminal liability and security measures, deters crime. Now 
we look at the other side of the coin: how criminal organizations affect legal policy. In that respect, 
crimes committed by organizations differ substantially from individual crime because organizations 
have a particular ability to influence and eventually shape the preferences of the criminal justice 
authorities.   
First, terrorism supporting organizations can more easily corrupt enforcers, regulators and 
judges. They are better organized, are wealthier and benefit from economies of scale in corruption. 
Corruption is especially problematic because it diminishes deterrence for the underlying criminal 
behavior (Bowles and Garoupa 1997; Chang, Lai, and Yang 2000; Polinsky and Shavell 2001; 
Garoupa and Klerman 2004). 
These organizations are also better placed to manipulate politicians and the media. By 
making use of large grants, generous campaign contributions, and influential lobbying 
organizations, they may directly (via legislator) or indirectly (via opinion makers) push law 
changes and legal reforms that benefit their illegal activities.  
Finally, terrorist supporting organizations benefit more from globalization and free 
movement of capital in order to better hide their illegitimate activities than individuals. Corporate 
avoidance activities are more effective.  Avoidance activities generate waste and reduce the 
effectiveness of law enforcement (Malik 1990; Gravelle and Garoupa 2002). 
These characteristics affect the design of optimal law enforcement. Within the classical 
model, some of the aspects we have pointed out have been addressed, for example, how 
enforcement should change when avoidance activities become quite frequent or how enforcement 
should be designed in an environment with corruption.  
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Another problem posed by terrorism is its power to redistribute future income in favor of 
the terrorist supporting group. There are two important transaction costs to be considered, direct 
(greater loss of income in successful attacks) and indirect (legislative and law enforcement costs). 
A balance between these direct and indirect costs must be achieved in order not to leave everyone 
worse-off (Garfinkle 2004). 
 
8.  A Sampling of Anti-Terror Measures 
In the U.S., the September 11, 2001 attacks prompted lawmakers to re-examine their ability to 
detect and prosecute terrorist activities effectively.  The primary result of this effort was the USA 
Patriot Act.  A number of other countries, which had their own experiences with terrorism, already 
had anti-terror laws in place.  Here we give a brief overview of a number of different countries’ 
responses to terrorism, highlighting details that relate to the discussions above.  Specifically, we 
look at how anti-terror measures incorporate the factors discussed above: (i) penalty enhancement 
for terrorist crimes or with terrorist motivation (severity and probability of punishment); (ii) special 
provisions against organized terrorism crime and supporting organizations, in particular cutting 
terrorists off from their funds; (iii) special provisions regarding voluntary surrender (to make 
cooperation in crime more difficult). 
 
8.1  United States 
U.S. anti-terrorism measures focus primarily on raising the probability of detection and punishment 
of planned terror activities, as opposed to using punishment enhancements to raise the expected 
marginal cost terrorists face.  While constitutional and procedural safeguards in U.S. criminal law 
generally pre-suppose a suspect’s innocence (presumption of innocence) and make it relatively 
difficult for prosecutors to rebut such a presumption through restrictive rules regarding the 
detention of suspects, the admissibility of evidence, and a host of other avenues, laws enacted to 
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combat terrorism and prosecutorial practice in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks have 
effectively moved toward a default that is much more neutral if not reversed in its presumptions 
regarding the guilt of terror suspects, at least those without U.S. citizenship.  Effectively, if the 
general presumption of innocence in the U.S. can be seen as an attempt to minimize Type II errors 
(i.e., the guilty go free) conditional on fulfilling a constraint regarding Type I errors (i.e., a 
minimum number of innocent people are wrongly apprehended and convicted), anti-terror policies 
seem to flip optimization problem to one in which the constraint involves Type II errors (i.e., very 
few guilty individuals go uncaptured) and we optimize over Type I errors. 
 From a mechanism design standpoint, such a switch could be optimal if the expected costs 
of damage done by free terrorists are quite large relative to the expected damage associated with a 
free non-terrorist criminal, assuming that society’s estimate of the cost of wrongful punishment 
remains unchanged.  Also, from the standpoint of marginal deterrence, it may be more effective to 
vary the probability of detection/punishment in cases where the level of punishment has an 
effective upper bound (e.g., execution). 
 One of the most visible attempts to reduce Type II errors has been the adoption of the Terror 
Alert System by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.  The Terror Alert System serves to 
place the population on guard when intelligence suggests that the likelihood of a terrorist attack has 
risen.  In addition to alerting the citizenry to be on the lookout for suspicious activities, the Terror 
Alert System serves as a coordination mechanism by which federal authorities can easily signal the 
need for additional protective measures, such as increased police presence and surveillance of high-
profile targets, to state and local authorities (Klick and Tabarrok 2005). 
 In terms of procedural reforms meant to improve public law enforcement’s ability to 
identify and capture potential terrorists, the USA Patriot Act (Public Law 107-56) contains a 
number of provisions that expand the scope of government surveillance powers, especially as they 
relate to telecommunications.17
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 The Patriot Act also contains a handful of provisions affecting penalties for those engaged 
directly or indirectly in terrorist activities: 
 
8.1.1  Penalty enhancement for terrorist crimes or with terrorist motivation 
The Patriot Act also includes provisions which increase the maximum term of imprisonment for 
terrorist activities to life in prison under some circumstances.  Further for non-life terms, the Act 
allows for a period of post-release supervision that can extend for the rest of the individual’s life 
(18 USCA § 3583). 
 
8.1.2  Special legislation/provisions to tackle group or organized individuals in terrorist activities 
The Patriot Act provides for federal prosecution of any individual who harbors or conceals or 
provides any material support to an individual he knows or has reason to know has or is about to 
commit a terrorist activity.  These actions can be punished with both fines and imprisonment (18 
USCA § 2339) with the sentence increased to life in prison in some cases for those who provide 
material support to a terrorist.   It also provides for the forfeiture of any assets held by an individual 
or organization that perpetrates or plans to perpetrate any act of terrorism (18 USCA § 981). 
 
8.1.3  Special issues regarding the provision of information regarding terrorist activities 
In the money laundering provisions of the Patriot Act, financial institutions are protected from any 
liability with respect to their customers, arising from regulatory or contractual obligations, if they 
voluntarily report potential violations of U.S. money laundering laws by organizations involved in 
supporting terrorist activities (31 USCA § 5318). 
 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
24 
 
8.1.4  Other aspects 
The Patriot Act gives the Attorney General the responsibility to hold in custody any alien about 
whom there is a reasonable suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities until the alien can be 
removed from the United States (8 USCA § 1226a). 
 
8.2   United Kingdom 
Much of the UK’s anti-terror legislation stems from difficulties with the IRA.  However, in the 
aftermath of the September 11 attacks18, attention shifted to the presence of foreign nationals who 
might be involved in international terrorism while residing in the UK. New legislation is currently 
being prepared in the aftermaths of the July 7 attacks. 
 
8.2.1  Penalty enhancement for terrorist crimes or with terrorist motivation 
Individuals convicted of engaging in terrorist activities can be sentenced to life in prison.  Further, 
the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT) created new criminal offenses for anyone who insights a terrorist 
act, provides terrorist training, or provides training in the use of firearms, explosives, or chemical, 
biological, or nuclear weapons.  The Act also provides for the forfeiture of any money or property 
held by an individual who violates the anti-terrorism laws if the money or property was going to be 
used to support terrorist activities. 
 
8.2.2 Special legislation/provisions to tackle group or organized individuals in terrorist activities 
The UK’s Prevention of Terrorism Act (first passed in 1974) essentially allowed the UK 
government to declare certain groups suspected of engaging in terrorist activities illegal, implying 
that membership in those groups is an offense for which someone could be arrested.  Fines and 
prison sentences could also be levied if an individual was found to have provided financial support 
to a proscribed group. 
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New provisions to reduce the possibility of terrorists making money through organized 
crime and disrupt financial operations supportive of terrorism have been implemented by the 
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 
 
8.2.3  Special issues regarding the provision of information regarding terrorist activities 
Under the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT), individuals who reasonably suspect that someone will 
engage or has engaged in a terrorist offense, but do not report this suspicion to law enforcement 
officials, can be fined or imprisoned. 
 
8.2.4  Other aspects 
In the wake of the September 11 attacks in the U.S., the UK passed the Anti-Terrorism Crime and 
Security Act (ATCSA) which allowed for the detention of foreign nationals who were suspected of 
but not convicted for involvement in international terrorism but could not be deported because they 
faced the prospect of torture or inhumane treatment in their country of origin.19  After the recent 
terrorist attacks in London (July 7 and 21, 2005), the British Government has announced further 
legal reforms to provide the police with adequate and more effective instruments (it could include 
access to email and mobile phone calls without previous judicial control) and tighter immigration 
laws (including deportation of radical clerics).  
 
8.3  Spain 
Given the activities of the Basque terrorist group ETA since the early seventies, Spain has 
passed several antiterrorism laws. Nowadays articles 571 to 580 of the Penal Code regulate the 
crime of terrorism, and several other pieces of legislation provide further restrictions on individuals 
or organizations suspected of terrorism.20 The conflict between antiterrorism laws and procedural 
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guarantees for the accused has been assessed several times by the Constitutional Court recognizing 
that a balance between both is hard to achieve.21
 
8.3.1  Penalty enhancement for terrorist crimes or with terrorist motivation 
The current legislation imposes longer imprisonment sentences for terrorist acts than similar 
offenses without terrorist motivation; it reduces the possibility of parole or any other mechanism 
that could undermine the effective duration of the sentence; it allows under exceptional 
circumstances the maximal sentence to be forty rather than the usual thirty years in prison. 
Antiterrorism law enforcement benefits from a special regime that allows custody for a longer 
period of time and empowers the police with extra powers for investigation and monitoring. Hence 
we can conjecture that law enforcement is more effective for terrorist crimes than otherwise. 
 
8.3.2  Special legislation/provisions to tackle group or organized individuals in terrorist activities 
An organization that is hierarchical, apparently stable, uses weapons, and practices violent acts 
against individuals or property, including murder or kidnapping, can be prosecuted as a terrorist 
group. Membership of a terrorist organization is punished as such (that is, independently of the 
crimes committed), including not only the direct members of the organization and those hired or 
contracted by the organization to pursue their interests, but also pure collaborators that favor in 
some respect the activities of the organization. Consequently, individuals who inform the 
organization about potential victims, who help the escape of members of the organization, or who 
offer any kind of help to the organization are liable under penal law. Sentences can go from five to 
ten years in prison plus fines.  
A particular point concerns those who individually or in group (political parties) promote 
and justify terrorist crimes and terrorists, or engage in hate speech against the victims of terrorism. 
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Not only they are also liable, but political parties that openly support terrorism or include convicted 
or suspected terrorists in their leadership are forbidden.  
 
8.3.3  Special issues regarding the provision of information regarding terrorist activities 
Self-reporting terrorists will benefit from special treatment under three conditions: (i) The 
individual has voluntarily abandoned any kind of involvement with terrorism, (ii) The individual 
self-reports to the authorities and confesses his or her own crimes, (iii) The individual actively 
cooperates with the authorities to produce evidence to convict other terrorists or stop terrorist 
activity. The reduction in the sentence is however not very significant and is up to the judge, not the 
prosecutor, to take such decision.  
 
8.3.4  Other aspects 
The legislation recognizes convictions for terrorism or membership of terrorist organizations 
abroad will be automatically equivalent to convictions in Spain for purposes of penalty 
enhancement for recidivism. 
 
8.4   Israel 
Israel has had anti-terrorist legislation in place since 1948.  In recent years, the country has gotten 
involved in international anti-terror efforts, enacting a law in 1994 which allows officials in the 
country to confiscate property in Israel belonging to any individual or organization declared by 
another country to be involved in terrorist activities, even if those activities were not directed 
toward Israel. 
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8.4.1  Penalty enhancement for terrorist crimes or with terrorist motivation 
In the 1948 law, any individual involved in the planning, implementation, or direct support of a 
terrorist organization or activity can be imprisoned for up to 20 years. Further, under the 1994 law, 
the payment of any compensation or support to the families of suicide bombers or others involved 
in terrorist activities is prohibited. 
 
8.4.2  Special legislation/provisions to tackle group or organized individuals in terrorist activities 
Indirect support of terrorist organizations such as the provision of funds, allowing the organization 
to use a residence for meetings, publication or broadcast of words of praise, sympathy, or 
encouragement of terrorist activities, and the solicitation of funding for terrorist activities is 
punishable by prison and fines. 
 
8.4.3  Other aspects 
In a holdover from British mandatory law, the Israeli government retains the right to demolish any 
real property owned by members of the nuclear family of a terrorist, presumably increasing the 
incentive for relatives to monitor the activities of potential terrorists.  Interestingly, in the original 
British law, this collateral punishment could be inflicted at the village level, but current Israeli 
practice limits the punishment to close family members only (Amit-Kohn, Renato, Glick and Biton 
1993). 
 
9.   A Mechanism Design Approach To Tensions Between Privacy and Security Concerns 
Especially in the U.S., anti-terror measures have generated some tension to the extent that 
improved surveillance, necessary for preventing terror attacks and for prosecuting individuals 
involved in the planning and execution of those attacks, will often conflict with the privacy 
interests of individuals not involved in terror activities.  This conflict between safety and privacy 
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has already drawn the Patriot Act under scrutiny and it has stood in the way of implementing 
seemingly efficient systems of law enforcement profiling. 
 In this section, we raise the possibility of designing an efficient sorting mechanism in which 
individuals will be provided with adequate incentives to reveal their type to law enforcement 
authorities.  By making the system voluntary, it would presumably respect the rights of non-
terrorist individuals with high privacy values, as well as providing some collateral benefits. 
 Specifically, we envision a system in which individuals agreeing to submit to heightened 
scrutiny would not have to pay a privacy tax of some kind.  For example, with respect to personal 
information collected by an internet service provider or a financial institution, those individuals 
agreeing to give law enforcement access to personal records could avoid paying an additional use 
tax.22  Those individuals valuing privacy will be willing to pay the use tax to keep their information 
away from authorities.23
 Presumably, those involved in terror activities will sort themselves into the tax group and 
those not involved in terror activities who do not value their privacy very highly will sort into the 
no-tax group.  Because authorities will be able to focus their traditional investigative techniques 
(i.e., those that do not involve an abridgement of currently existing privacy protections) on a subset 
of the population, doing so will be lower cost than examining the non-sorted population.  Further, 
revenue raised from the privacy tax can help to fund traditional investigations. 
 The merits of such a system could be undermined to the extent that individuals involved in 
terror activities have an incentive to pose as innocent individuals by sorting into the no tax group.  
The danger of this strategy is mitigated, however, as authorities will then have access to the private 
information of those individuals, lowering the cost of monitoring them. 
 An additional problem with such a system involves the general legal/political prohibition on 
selling rights that are seen as fundamental, a category within which privacy rights may fall.  
Presumably the prohibition on selling such rights emanates from the realization that the interests of 
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the current self may diverge from the interests of the future self when certain conditions change.  
That is, while I may not value my privacy now that I have not done anything wrong, if I do 
something wrong in the future, I may value privacy more highly.  Effectively, we may be hesitant 
to allow current selves to disadvantage future selves through the revocation of certain rights.  Even 
if we structure the tax system in such a way that an individual chooses his status for a discrete 
period, switching status may provide information about an individual’s changing behavior which 
will undermine the future self’s privacy right. 
 This dilemma revolves around the issue of who holds property rights in privacy and is 
therefore largely outside the boundaries of economics.  However, from a consequentialist 
perspective, one benefit of allowing individuals to sell their privacy right is that it might serve as a 
commitment mechanism on the future self.  That is, if conditions change such that the future self 
would be predisposed to undertaking a terrorist activity (or some other illegal activity), if the 
privacy right was sold in the past, the marginal cost of engaging in the prohibited behavior will be 
increased. 
 The last concern with this sorting system involves the possibility for authorities to use 
private information to investigate and prosecute (or blackmail on the basis of) activities beyond the 
scope of the original intent of the system.  Such a concern is not avoidable to the extent that it 
would be difficult for the state to commit to not using information in other domains.  However, to 
some extent, such a problem exists even in the absence of such a system.  That is, individuals with 
access to the private information could always use it (illegally) to engage in blackmail, and we 
currently rely on constitutional safeguards to stop authorities from using ill-gotten information in 
the investigation and prosecution of criminal activities.  It is not clear why the same safeguards 
could not restrict the use of private information to the intended domains. 
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10.  Conclusion 
 Even though economic analyses of terrorist activities and groups are relatively 
underdeveloped, we can gain some insights into these activities by looking toward the economic 
models of crime.  Clearly, some modification of these models is necessary in the terrorism context, 
but it would seem that the existing models can serve as a guide to understanding terrorist activities, 
as well as being beneficial to the development of anti-terror measures.  In this article, we reviewed 
the existing law and economics literature on crime, noting where various models might apply (with 
some modifications) to the terror context.  We then looked at a sample of anti-terror laws, 
highlighting the measures that are implied by the economic models.  Lastly, we suggest a policy 
innovation that would attempt to mitigate the tension between protecting the privacy interests of 
non-terrorists, while still improving the state’s ability to monitor and deter potential terrorists. 
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Notes 
1 The seminal paper is Becker (1968). 
2 For a criticism of the deterrence literature in terrorism see Frey and Luenchinger (2004). 
3 See on terrorist preferences and rational Bernholz (2004). 
4 Examples include the IRA and ETA as we will see when we discuss anti-terrorism legislation in 
the UK and Spain in section 7. 
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5 For the implications of strict versus negligence-based vicarious liability on the economic 
incentives to monitor potential wrongdoers, see Mattiacci and Parisi (2003). 
6  Most relevant is the recent work by Parisi and Mattiacci (2004). In ancient societies, rules of 
communal responsibility permitted the imposition of sanctions (both physical and pecuniary) on a 
wrongdoer’s clan. These rules followed the collective ownership structure of early communities. 
The authors provide an economic explanation for the widespread use of communal liability rules in 
ancient law, considering the factors that determined the rise and subsequent abandonment of 
communal liability. See also Parisi (2001).  
7 Early rules of communal liability were an effective instrument for restoring the equilibrium 
between groups and to promote intra-group monitoring incentives, in an environment characterized 
by limited access to information outside the group and underdeveloped discovery systems. Second, 
these societies were characterized by a substantial lack of privacy and this facilitated the 
opportunities for cross-monitoring members within the group. Posner (1980) considers the function 
of privacy, or lack thereof, in a system characterized by communal responsibility and collective 
ownership. He maintains that the characteristics of strict and communal liability for injuries, and 
collective guilt, fundamentally derive from the high information costs of ancient society. A way of 
limiting these costs is by maintaining crowded living conditions that deny privacy, thereby 
increasing the production of information (but at the same time reducing the production of some 
socially useful information by failing to assign a property right in such information). Because of the 
limited extent of personal privacy, detection of crimes is high and so is the probability of 
punishment. This in turn serves to keep the required level of sanctions low and to moderate the lack 
of individual incentives to contribute to the common good. 
8 Inducing optimal monitoring and ensuring internal sanctioning (that is, credibility of firm's 
enforcement policy) is also not immune to controversy. Arlen (1994) identifies a “potentially 
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perverse effect” by which holding firms (vicariously) liable for offenses committed by its 
employees can increase enforcement costs. If the information that the firm acquires can be used to 
increase its own probability of incurring liability, the firm will not monitor optimally. In order to 
tackle this effect, a composite liability regime where some duty-based liability or mitigation 
provisions are included has been proposed. However, it has been noted when information costs are 
high, strict liability could be preferable. 
9 Exodus 20:5 and Deuteronomy 5:9. Parisi and Dari Mattiacci (2004) show that early clans tended 
to remain relatively small in size (and to become even smaller, as group wealth increased), in spite 
of the forgone economies of scale in external security. External security was obtained through 
coalitions of clans, but the boundaries of the group for purposes of joint ownershipand communal 
responsibility never extended beyond the closer family. This still characterizes the domain of 
vicarious liability of the family in the Romanistic legal systems, where the finding of a common 
ancestor within the last three generations serves as the general threshold for establishing a family 
link. 
10 Arend and Beck (1995), distinguish three different levels with which a group or state can foster 
terrorist activities: (1) toleration, (2) support; or (3) sponsorship. Higher levels of involvement also 
include lesser forms. 
11 Murphy (1989) distinguishes twelve ways in which support to terrorism can be given, including 
assets, financial support, territory, training, intelligence, weapons and explosives, transportation, 
technology, and rhetorical support. 
12 See for example Miceli and Segerson (2004). They show that group punishment can never 
dominate individual punishment on pure deterrence arguments.  See also the application to 
terrorism by Gan, Williams, and Wiseman (2004). 
13 Useful surveys can be found in Garoupa (1997), and in Polinsky and Shavell (2000).  
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14 Note however the debate concerning the efficiency of wealthier individuals being more or less 
severely punished. See Friedman (1981); Lott (1987); Garoupa (2001); Garoupa and Gravelle 
(2003). 
15 Obvious examples are the failed July 21, 2005 bombings in London. 
16 Evidence to this effect can be found in Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants 
(translation available at http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/jihadmanual.html) which 
describes among the qualifications necessary for its members, “Sacrifice: He has to be willing to do 
the work and undergo martyrdom for the purpose of achieving the goal and establishing the religion 
of majestic Allah on earth.”  Further evidence can be found in the requirement that members be 
cautious and prudent. 
17 For a good discussion of the degree to which the Patriot Act expands the government’s 
surveillance powers, see 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 607. 
18 The Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT) came into force on February 2001 in response to the changing 
threat from terrorism, and replaced previous temporary anti-terrorism legislation that dealt 
primarily with the IRA. Just after the September 11 attacks new legislation was passed, the Anti-
Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA). The Prevention of Terrorism Bill was 
introduced to the House of Commons on February 2005. 
19 The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) was repealed by the House of Lords 
by December 2004 under the notion that it was discriminatory and not proportionate to the threat 
the UK faced from terrorism. Deportation in such instances is prohibited under Article 3 of the 
European Commission on Human Rights (ECHR).  This provision was found to be incompatible 
with the ECHR’s Articles 5 and 14 due to the differential treatment of foreign nationals relative to 
citizens of the UK.  A compromise was reached in which the same prohibitions would be applied to 
UK citizens and foreign nationals alike, whereby individuals who are suspected of engaging in 
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terrorist activities can be subjected to curfews, limitations on their use of telecommunications 
equipment, limitations on what individuals they may associate with, etc. The government has 
introduced a new Prevention of Terrorism Bill to overcome the problem; the aim of the Prevention 
of Terrorism Bill is to put in place measures which are fully compatible with the European 
Convention of Human Rights and which are applicable to both British and foreign nationals 
regardless of the type of terrorism involved (whether it is domestic or international). 
20 Law 3/1988, dated of May 25, develops the legal definition of crimes by terrorist organizations 
(on top of crimes by individual members), including the crime of membership of a terrorist 
organization; Law 4/1988, dated of May 25, introduces a more flexible system of procedural 
guarantees for those accused of terrorism; Law 7/2000, dated of December 22, regulating hate 
speech; Law 6/2002, dated of June 27, effectively illegalizes the political wing of terrorist groups 
(hence, also cutting access to public funding for legally constituted political parties); Law 7/2003, 
dated of June 30, allows penalty enhancement for terrorist crimes and reduces the possibility of 
parole. 
21 For example, the following decisions of the Constitutional Court: STC of December 16, 1987 (on 
delimiting the elements that should be used to characterize a terrorist organization); STC of March 
12, 1993 (on the comprehensive meaning of membership of terrorist organizations); STC of March 
3, 1994 (on the possibility of longer period of custody); STC of July 20, 1999 (on the punishment 
for collaboration with terrorist organizations). 
22 It would be analytically equivalent to provide a subsidy to those willing to give up their privacy 
as opposed to taxing those who retain it. 
23 We plan to develop a formal model that provides the conditions for the separating equilibrium in 
a subsequent article. 
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